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Handbook Contingent Valuation
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Brand New: A new, unread, unused book in perfect condition with no missing or damaged pages. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. It examines ecometric issues, conceptual underpinnings, implementation issues as well as alternatives to contingent valuation. Chapters include those on the history of contingent valuation, a practical guide to its implementation, the use of experimental approaches, an ecological ecomics perspective on contingent valuation and approaches for developing nations.
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Mariana Mazzucato. Stock Price Volatility and Technological Change. Alexander Orakhelashvili. Graeme A. International Handbook on Public-Private Partnerships. Indeed, with such a product price, the output of commercial suppliers can be expected to be zero. On the other hand, zero output of such desirable products patently cannot be optimal. But any non-zero price cannot be optimal either, for, if additional consumers can, for all practical purposes, be supplied at zero marginal cost, the exclusion of any consumer by a non-zero price must entail a social loss preventing a benefit to a consumer whose cost to society would be zero.
This is only the beginning of the puzzles. Suppose that this dilemma is ignored as an unsolvable theoretical problem, and non-zero prices are the norm. What second-best price is consistent with maximal welfare benefits? The textbook conclusion does not suffice because price equal to marginal cost will generally not allow recoupment by the suppliers. The problem is traceable to the character of sunk cost that is common in artistic activity. Standard theory tells us that sunk costs do not matter, that their magnitude should not affect optimal price.
As a piece of ancient history that cannot be changed by any current or future pricing decision, as these are simply irrelevant.
But in the arts, sunk costs are not just historical data. The problem is that sunk outlays, char- acteristically, must be incurred again and again. For example, the production costs of a newly mounted drama are indeed a sunk cost, and if an acting company were to present that drama and no other for the indefinite future, the sunk cost would be irrelevant. It would not matter whether the future performances rewarded the investors handsomely or failed to return any of their outlays.
But that is patently not how an acting company carries on its activities. New productions must be brought to the stage, normally at fairly frequent intervals, so that sunk outlays take the form of an intertemporal stream of peri- odic and relatively large expenditures, rather than a once-and-for-all occurrence. And future sunk costs are still variable, not sunk, in the present.
To induce investors to keep providing the necessary resources, past recoupment history must be such as to promise the possibility or even the likelihood of recovery of future sunk investments. This is true not only of stage productions, but also of the training required for singers or dancers. Trained performers have a very limited working life, and the sunk outlays entailed in their training must be repeated constantly if the activities in their fields are not to come to an end.
These difficulties have a near perfect analogue in the new economy, in which innova- tion has become the prime weapon of competition in much of industry. The proprietary knowledge that emerges from inventive activity is well known to have significant public- good properties, and competition forces firms to repeat constantly the sunk outlays that are entailed in the innovation process.
Not only are these problems in the performing arts and the innovation process the same, but it is arguable that the pricing principles that are applicable to either are also pertinent to the other. Government buyout of intellectual property and the public-good problem The analogy with the economics of innovation immediately offers one way of dealing with the problem that contributes further justification for government support.
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In the. Both of these raise the public-good problem: they are designed to reward the creator of intellectual property by enhancing that persons ability to exclude unauthor- ized users, thereby making it prospectively possible for the creator to extract a price for its use. But that non-zero price runs into the DupuitSamuelson dilemma: why exclude anyone from the benefit of costless usage of a product?
There is a considerable literature see, for example, Kremer, , for an excellent discussion and citations of other writings that suggests a way to cut this Gordian knot: patent buyouts. This entails outright purchase of the property by government, with the creators thereby offered appropriate rewards, in return for which they give up any right to charge for use of their creations.
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd - books from this publisher (ISBNs begin with )
Kremer provides a dramatic example:. In the government of France combined elements of the patent system and of direct gov- ernment support of research by buying out the patent for Daguerreotype photography and placing the technique in the public domain.
After the patent was bought out, Daguerreotype photography was rapidly adopted worldwide and was subject to myriad technical improve- ments. Obviously, this goes a good part of the way towards solving the problem, as it provides the desired incentive for creative activity, while not precluding socially costless access to others. Such an approach is possible in the arts, but it must be recognized that it does not solve the problem completely.
First, as Ramsey analysis shows see below , the gov- ernment subvention, and the resources it provides to recipients, must come from some- where. This, in turn, must entail non-zero taxes, which themselves unavoidably distort decisions and so entail welfare costs. Second, there remains the unsolved theoretical problem of determining an optimal buyout price, particularly in light of the fact that a patent or copyright is a deliberate grant of possible monopoly power to the creator of the intellectual property, who may well seek to extract a monopoly profit via the price.
Finally, there is the problem of reality while governments are often willing to supply part of such a subvention, they may not be prepared to provide enough to permit the activities to remain solvent with a non-zero price for their use, a problem exacerbated by the arts ever-rising real costs.
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